18th Jul 2005

 

 

National Arbitration Forum

 

DECISION

 

Anwar Kazi v. Domain Deluxe c/o Domain Admin

Claim Number: FA0505000488845

 

PARTIES

Complainant is Anwar Kazi (“Complainant”), represented by Thomas D. Foster, 12760 High Bluff Drive, Suite 300, San Diego, CA 92130. Respondent is Domain Deluxe c/o Domain Admin (“Respondent”) represented by Ari Goldberger of ESQwire.com Law Firm, 35 Cameo Drive, Cherry Hill, NJ 08003.

 

REGISTRAR AND DISPUTED DOMAIN NAME 

The domain name at issue is <joblog.com>, registered with Nameview, Inc.

 

PANEL

The undersigned certify that they have acted independently and impartially and to the best of their knowledge they have no known conflict in serving as Panelist in this proceeding. Barry Schreiber, Esq., Diane Cabell, Esq., and Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson sit as Panelists. 

 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Complainant submitted a Complaint to the National Arbitration Forum electronically May 31, 2005; the National Arbitration Forum received a hard copy of the Complaint May 31, 2005.

 

On May 31, 2005, Nameview, Inc. confirmed by e-mail to the National Arbitration Forum that the domain name <joblog.com> is registered with Nameview, Inc. and that the Respondent is the current registrant of the name. Nameview, Inc. verified that Respondent is bound by the Nameview, Inc. registration agreement and thereby has agreed to resolve domain-name disputes brought by third parties in accordance with ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Policy”).

 

On June 8, 2005, a Notification of Complaint and Commencement of Administrative Proceeding (the “Commencement Notification”), setting a deadline of June 28, 2004, by which Respondent could file a Response to the Complaint, was transmitted to Respondent via e-mail, post and fax, to all entities and persons listed on Respondent’s registration as technical, administrative and billing contacts, and to postmaster@joblog.com by e-mail.

 

A timely Response was received and determined to be complete on June 28, 2005.

 

A timely Additional Submission by Complainant was received on July 1, 2005.

 

On July 8, 2005, pursuant to Complainant’s request to have the dispute decided by a three-member Panel, the National Arbitration Forum appointed Barry Schreiber, Esq., Diane Cabell, Esq. and Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson as Panelists.

 

RELIEF SOUGHT

Complainant requests that the domain name be transferred from Respondent to Complainant.

 

PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS

A.     Complainant makes the following allegations:

1.      Respondent registered a domain name that is identical to or confusingly similar to a mark in which Complainant has exclusive rights.

 

2.      Respondent has no rights to or legitimate interests in the domain name that uses Complainant’s protected mark in its entirety.

 

3.      Respondent registered and held the domain name in bad faith.

 

B.     Respondent alleges as follows:

1.      Complainant has no enforceable rights in the mark.

 

2.      Respondent has rights to and legitimate interests in the mark and domain name because the name is descriptive and anyone can register a descriptive name.

 

3.      Respondent has used the domain name prior to the initiation of this dispute.

 

C.     Both parties filed Additional Submissions.

 

1.      Complainant urges that it has common law rights consistent with its date of first use in commerce.

 

2.      Respondent urges that it does not and that moreover Complainant submitted no evidence to show secondary meaning at any point.

 

 

 

 

FINDINGS

 

Complainant alleges that Respondent’s domain name is confusingly similar to its mark JOBSLOG.COM and that Respondent has wrongfully typosquatted a domain site using Complainant’s protected mark.

 

Complainant also alleges that Respondent has no rights in the domain name using Complainant’s protected mark because Respondent passively held it. After Complainant registered its mark, Respondent started using the domain name site in the same general area that Complainant is active in, providing information about employment.

 

Complainant registered the service mark JOBSLOG with the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Reg. No. 2,943,216, April 19, 2005. Complainant urged a first use in commerce of December 31, 2002. Complainant filed the application May 16, 2003.

 

Complainant urges that it had common law rights in the mark by December 31, 2002, and urges that Respondent did not post content at the site prior to December 31, 2002.

 

            Respondent registered the <joblog.com> domain name August 30, 2001.

 

Respondent’s position is that the Complaint must be dismissed because Complainant has no enforceable trademark rights under the Policy. Complainant’s registration is on the USPTO’s Supplemental Register only. Under US law, this is prima facie evidence that the mark is merely descriptive and not sufficiently distinctive to entitle Complainant to exclusive use of the mark.

 

Respondent also argues that it has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name because it incorporates the descriptive term “JOB LOG.” Respondent asserts that it is well established under the Policy that anyone is entitled to register a domain name incorporating a common descriptive term and that the first to register such domain has a legitimate interest in it.

 

Furthermore, it is impossible for Respondent to have registered it in bad faith because Complainant had no plausible trademark rights at the time Respondent registered the disputed domain. Respondent registered the disputed domain name August 30, 2001, almost two years before Complainant filed its trademark application for the JOBSLOG mark, and more than a year before Complainant’s alleged December 31, 2002, first use date.

 

In response to Complainant’s additional submission, Respondent points out that Complainant’s argument that it used the mark prior to Respondent’s active use of the domain is irrelevant under the Policy. Under 4(c)(i), all that matters is whether or not Respondent “before any notice…of the dispute” used the disputed domain “in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services.” The Complainant acknowledges that Respondent’s site was active long before notice of this dispute.

 

Lastly, Respondent denies the relevance of Ski Utah, Inc. v. The Lodging Company Reservations, Ltd. No. D2003-0776 (WIPO Nov. 7, 2003). In Ski Utah, the mark owner had provided evidence that it was a decades’ old enterprise with substantial consumer traffic, had invested millions of dollars in marketing and had also owned a registered trademark for over 20 years. The panel determined that Ski Utah had met the burden of proving that it common law mark had acquired secondary meaning. Complainant presented no such facts in the present case.

 

 

DISCUSSION

Paragraph 15(a) of the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the “Rules”) instructs this Panel to “decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and documents submitted in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules and principles of law that it deems applicable.”

 

Paragraph 4(a) of the Policy requires that the Complainant must prove each of the following three elements to obtain an order that a domain name should be cancelled or transferred:

 

(1)    the domain name registered by the Respondent is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights;

(2)    Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

(3)    the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.

 

Identical to and/or Confusingly Similar

 

Complainant asserts that it has established rights in the JOBSLOG mark through registration of the mark on the Supplemental Register with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”). See Action Sports Videos v. Reynolds, D2001-1239 (WIPO Dec. 13, 2001) (holding that although the complainant’s registration on the Supplemental Register denotes a descriptive mark without secondary meaning, the complainant nevertheless had standing to initiate a UDRP claim because the Policy at paragraph 4a(i) requires only that the complainant have (mark) “rights” in the disputed domain name, strong or weak though they be); see also Cold War Museum v Jampol, FA 96594 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 26, 2001) (finding that the complainant had established rights in the COLD WAR MUSEUM mark through registration of the mark on the Supplemental Register as well as by virtue of the distinctiveness the mark has developed and recognition of the mark by the U.S. government). 

 

Complainant also contends that it has established common law rights in the JOBSLOG mark through continuous use of the mark in commerce since December 31, 2002. See Tuxedos By Rose v. Nunez, FA 95248 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 17, 2000) (finding common law rights in a mark where its use was continuous and ongoing, and secondary meaning was established); see also S.A. Bendheim Co., Inc. v. Hollander Glass, FA 142318 (Nat. Arb. Forum Mar. 13, 2003) (holding that the Complainant established rights in the descriptive RESTORATION GLASS mark through proof of secondary meaning associated with the mark).

 

Moreover, Complainant alleges that Respondent’s <joblog.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark, as the domain name merely omits the letter “s” from Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark. The Panel may find that such a change is not enough to overcome the confusingly similar aspects of Respondent’s domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(i). See Compaq Info. Techs. Group, L.P. v. Seocho, FA 103879 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 25, 2002) (finding that the domain name <compq.com> is confusingly similar to the complainant’s COMPAQ mark because the omission of the letter “a” in the domain name does not significantly change the overall impression of the mark); see also Victoria’s Secret v. Internet Inv. Firm Trust, FA 94344 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 9, 2000) (finding the domain name <victoriasecret.com> to be confusingly similar to the complainant’s trademark, VICTORIA’S SECRET).    

 

Furthermore, the addition of the top-level domain “.com” is irrelevant in determining whether the <joblog.com> domain name is confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark. See Pomellato S.p.A v. Tonetti, D2000-0493 (WIPO July 7, 2000) (finding <pomellato.com> identical to the complainant’s mark because the generic top-level domain (gTLD) “.com” after the name POMELLATO is not relevant); see also Rollerblade, Inc. v. McCrady, D2000-0429 (WIPO June 25, 2000) (finding that the top level of the domain name such as “.net” or “.com” does not affect the domain name for the purpose of determining whether it is identical or confusingly similar).

 

Notwithstanding Complainant’s position and the support among the cases for Complainant’s argument, different facts in this case distinguish those cases. Here, Respondent correctly argues that the <joblog.com> domain name is not confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark because Respondent’s registration of the disputed domain name predates any use or registration of the JOBSLOG mark by Complainant by almost two years. See Phoenix Mortgage Corp. v. Toggas, D2001-0101 (WIPO Mar. 30, 2001) (finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) “necessarily implies that Complainant’s rights predate Respondent’s registration . . . of the domain name”); see also Intermark Media, Inc. v. Wang Logic Corp., FA 139660 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2003) (finding that any enforceable interest that the complainant may have in its common law mark did not predate the respondent’s domain name registration, therefore finding that Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) had not been satisfied); see also Transpark LLC v. Network Adm’r, FA 135602 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 21, 2003) (finding that the complainant failed to satisfy Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) because the respondent’s domain name registration predated the complainant’s rights in its mark by nearly two years); see also Bus. Architecture Group, Inc. v Reflex Publ’g., FA 97051 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 5, 2001) (the complainant did not adequately demonstrate common law rights that predated the domain name registration).  

 

Respondent further correctly asserts that Complainant does not have enforceable rights in the JOBSLOG mark under the Policy because its mark was registered on the Supplemental Register due to it being merely descriptive of Complainant’s business. See Chiappetta v. Morales, D2002-1103 (WIPO Jan. 20, 2003) (holding that the complainant’s registration of the DISCOUNT HYDROPONICS mark on the Supplemental Register did not confer any rights under the UDRP); see also CyberTrader, Inc. v. Bushell, D2001-1019 (WIPO Oct. 30, 2001) (stating that Supplemental Register “provides the Complainant with no protectable rights” in its marks); see also Am.’s Cmty. Bankers Corp. v. Wing., D2000-1780 (WIPO Mar. 5, 2001) (“Relying solely upon Complainant’s registrations on the Supplemental Register, the Panel must conclude that Complainant’s marks AMERICA’S COMMUNITY BANKER and AMERICA’S COMMUNITY BANKERS are descriptive terms that have not acquired distinctiveness. Accordingly, the Panel finds that Complainant has not proven the first prong of the UDRP, which provides that the complainant must have rights in the mark upon which the complaint is based.”).  

 

The Panel finds that Complainant failed to show enforceable rights in a mark contained within a domain name that was registered by the Respondent the year before Complainant urges first use in commerce or common law rights.

 

Complainant has not satisfied ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(i) to show “confusing similarity” with a protected mark that predated the registration and use.

 

Rights or Legitimate Interests

 

Complainant argues that Respondent is not commonly known by the <joblog.com> domain name and therefore lacks rights and legitimate interests in the domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii). See Tercent Inc. v. Yi, FA 139720 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 10, 2003) (stating “nothing in Respondent’s WHOIS information implies that Respondent is ‘commonly known by’ the disputed domain name” as one factor in determining that Policy ¶ 4(c)(ii) does not apply); see also Charles Jourdan Holding AG v. AAIM, D2000-0403 (WIPO June 27, 2000) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where (1) Respondent is not a licensee of Complainant; (2) Complainant’s prior rights in the mark precede Respondent’s registration; (3) Respondent is not commonly known by the domain name in question).

 

Complainant asserts as well that although Respondent registered the <joblog.com> domain name in 2001, Respondent did not make any use of the disputed domain name until 2004. Complainant asserts that this period of inactivity is sufficient to establish that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names pursuant to Policy ¶¶ 4(c)(i) and (iii). See Vestel Elektronik Sanayi ve Ticaret AS v. Kahveci, D2000-1244 (WIPO Nov. 11, 2000) (“[M]erely registering the domain names is not sufficient to establish rights or legitimate interests for purposes of paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.”); see also Chanel, Inc. v. Heyward, D2000-1802 (WIPO Feb. 23, 2001) (finding no rights or legitimate interests where “Respondent registered the domain name and did nothing with it”); see also Ziegenfelder Co. v. VMH Enter., Inc., D2000-0039 (WIPO Mar. 14, 2000) (finding that failure to provide a product or service or develop the site demonstrates that the respondents have not established any rights or legitimate interests in the domain name).

 

Complainant also urges that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests in the <joblog.com> domain name because Respondent’s misspelling of Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark, by omitting the letter ‘s,’ constitutes typosquatting. See Diners Club Int’l Ltd. v. Domain Admin******It’s all in the name******, FA 156839 (Nat. Arb. Forum June 23, 2003) (holding that Respondent’s <wwwdinersclub.com> domain name, a typosquatted version of Complainant’s DINERS CLUB mark, was evidence in and of itself that Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name vis-à-vis Complainant); see also IndyMac Bank F.S.B. v. Ebeyer, FA 175292 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 19, 2003) (finding that Respondent lacked rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain names because it “engaged in the practice of typosquatting by taking advantage of Internet users who attempt to access Complainant’s <indymac.com> website but mistakenly misspell Complainant’s mark by typing the letter ‘x’ instead of the letter ‘c.'”). 

 

Again, despite Complainant’s arguments and the cases that would support that view, the facts here distinguish those holdings. Here, Respondent correctly shows that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the <joblog.com> domain name because Respondent registered the domain name the year before Complainant urges that it acquired common law rights in the mark and almost two years prior to Complainant’s filing a trademark application for the phrase “Jobslog.” See Warm Things, Inc. v. Weiss, D2002-0085 (WIPO Apr. 18, 2002) (finding that the Respondent had rights or legitimate interests in a domain name when its registration of that domain name occurred before Complainant had established rights in its alleged mark); see also Latent Tech. Group, Inc. v. Fritchie, FA 95285 (Nat. Arb. Forum Sept. 1, 2000) (finding that the respondent did have a legitimate interest in the domain name where the complainant applied for registration of the mark after the respondent registered the domain name and the complainant had not proven any earlier use of the mark); see also Parachute, Inc. v. Jones, FA 94947 (Nat. Arb. Forum July 12, 2000) (denying transfer of the domain name because the respondent’s use of the PARACHUTE mark and the domain name in question preceded any use of the service mark the by complainant).

 

Moreover, Respondent also correctly alleges that Complainant’s <joblog.com> domain name is merely composed of descriptive terms, and therefore, Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the disputed domain name pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii). See Energy Source Inc. v. Your Energy Source, FA 96364 (Nat. Arb. Forum Feb. 19, 2001) (finding that Respondent has rights and legitimate interests in the domain name where “Respondent has persuasively shown that the domain name is comprised of generic and/or descriptive terms, and, in any event, is not exclusively associated with Complainant’s business”); see also iLeads.com LLC v. Elec. Mktg. Sys., Inc., FA 187636 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 13, 2003) (finding that the respondent had rights and legitimate interests in the <aleads.com> domain name because it used the term “leads” in the generic sense to refer to the sale of leads over the Internet).

 

Furthermore, Respondent contends that Complainant failed to meet its burden in proving that Respondent lacks rights and legitimate interests because Complainant failed to point to particular facts and circumstances supporting its allegations. See Lush LTD v. Lush Environs, FA 96217 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 13, 2001) (finding that even when the respondent does file a response, the complainant must allege facts, which if true, would establish that the respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name); see also Graman USA Inc. v. Shenzhen Graman Indus. Co., FA 133676 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2003) (finding that absent a showing of any facts by the complainant that establish the respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the disputed domain name, the panel may decline to transfer the disputed domain name).

 

The Panel finds that Respondent registered the domain name the year before Complainant urges that it acquired common law rights by first use in commerce and two years before Complainant applied for legal rights in the mark.

 

Complainant did not show rights to and legitimate interests in the mark that pre-dated Respondent’s registration of the mark. Complainant has not satisfied ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(ii) requiring establishment of “rights or legitimate interests.”

 

Registration and Use in Bad Faith

 

Complainant further avers that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith under Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) as Respondent is using the domain name <joblog.com> to intentionally attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website, by creating a likelihood of confusion with Complainant as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of its website. See H-D Michigan, Inc. v. Petersons Auto, FA 135608 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 8, 2003) (finding that the disputed domain name was registered and used in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) through the respondent’s registration and use of the infringing domain name to intentionally attempt to attract Internet users to its fraudulent website by using the complainant’s famous marks and likeness); see also G.D. Searle & Co. v. Celebrex Drugstore, FA 123933 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 21, 2002) (finding that the respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(b)(iv) because the respondent was using the confusingly similar domain name to attract Internet users to its commercial website).

 

Moreover, Complainant argues that Respondent’s <joblog.com> domain name causes Internet users to mistakenly believe that the disputed domain name is affiliated with Complainant. Complainant asserts that the initial user confusion that the domain name causes is evidence that Respondent registered and used the domain name in bad faith. See Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Kil, D2000-1409 (WIPO Dec. 9, 2000) (finding bad faith registration and use where it is “inconceivable that the respondent could make any active use of the disputed domain names without creating a false impression of association with the Complainant”); see also Perot Sys. Corp. v. Perot.net, FA 95312 (Nat. Arb. Forum Aug. 29, 2000) (finding bad faith where the domain name in question is obviously connected with the complainant’s well-known marks, thus creating a likelihood of confusion strictly for commercial gain).

 

Furthermore, Complainant contends that Respondent registered and used the disputed domain name in bad faith because Respondent’s <joblog.com> domain name illustrates “typosquatting” because Respondent misspelled Complainant’s famous mark by omitting the letter ‘s,’ causing Internet users seeking Complainant’s JOBSLOG mark to become confused. See Zone Labs, Inc. v. Zuccarini, FA 190613 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 15, 2003) (“Respondent’s registration and use of [the <zonelarm.com> domain name] that capitalizes on the typographical error of an Internet user is considered typosquatting. Typosquatting, itself is evidence of bad faith registration and use pursuant to Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii).”); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Prof’l Baseball Leagues v. Zuccarini, D2002-1011 (WIPO Jan. 21, 2003) (“Typosquatting is the intentional misspelling of words with intent to intercept and siphon off traffic from its intended destination, by preying on Internauts who make common typing errors. Typosquatting is inherently parasitic and of itself evidence of bad faith”); see also Marriott Int’l, Inc. v. Seocho, FA 149187 (Nat. Arb. Forum Apr. 28, 2003) (finding that the respondent’s <marrriott.com> domain name was confusingly similar to the complainant’s MARRIOTT mark because “Respondent’s typosquatting, by its definition, renders the domain name confusingly similar to Complainant’s mark”).

 

The Complainant cannot prevail in this case because the facts support the Respondent. Complainant failed to meet its burden in proving bad faith registration and use because Complainant failed to point to particular facts and circumstances supporting its allegations. See Graman USA Inc. v. Shenzhen Graman Indus. Co., FA 133676 (Nat. Arb. Forum Jan. 16, 2003) (finding that general allegations of bad faith without supporting facts or specific examples do not supply a sufficient basis upon which the panel may conclude that the respondent acted in bad faith); see also White Pine Software, Inc. v. Desktop Consulting, Inc., D2000-0539 (WIPO Aug. 31, 2000) (declining to transfer the domain name where a full factual record has not been presented to the panel such that a conclusive determination can be made regarding the parties’ respective claims to the contested domain name).

 

Further, it is difficult to envision the circumstance in which Complainant could show bad faith in this case. Respondent registered the disputed domain name prior to the Complainant’s admitted first use in commerce and Respondent used the <joblog.com> domain name prior to any notice of this claim. See Reid v. Chao, FA 154587 (Nat. Arb. Forum May 29, 2003) (finding that the respondent could not have registered the disputed domain name in bad faith where its registration came months before the complainant filed its trademark application and no evidence of common-law rights in the mark were submitted to the panel); see also Aspen Grove, Inc. v. Aspen Grove, D2001-0798 (WIPO Oct. 5, 2001) (finding that it is impossible for the respondent to register a disputed domain name in bad faith if the complainant’s company did not exist at the time of registration); see also Open Sys. Computing AS v. degli Alessandri, D2000-1393 (WIPO Dec. 11, 2000) (finding no bad faith where the respondent registered the domain name in question before application and commencement of use of the trademark by the complainant); see also Jensen Research Corp. v. Future Media Architects, Inc., CPR00 0310 (CPR May 20, 2003):

“Some panelists have interpreted paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Policy to require proof of trademark rights in existence as of the date on which the disputed domain name was registered or acquired. Other panelists consider present-day trademark rights sufficient under paragraph 4(a)(i), but require proof of trademark rights that predate the domain name in order to satisfy the bad faith registration requirement contained in paragraph 4(a)(iii).”

Id. Furthermore, Respondent argues that its registration and use of the <joblog.com> domain name does not constitute bad faith if the Panel concludes that Respondent has been and is currently making a bona fide offering of goods and services. See DJF Assocs., Inc. v. AIB Commc’ns, FA 95612 (Nat. Arb. Forum Nov. 1, 2000) (finding the respondent has shown that it has a legitimate interest in the domain name because the respondent selected the name in good faith for its website, and was offering services under the domain name prior to the initiation of the dispute); see also Mule Lighting, Inc. v. CPA, FA 95558 (Nat. Arb. Forum Oct. 17, 2000) (finding no bad faith where the respondent has an active website that has been in use for two years and where there was no intent to cause confusion with the complainant’s website and business); see also Schering AG v. Metagen GmbH, D2000-0728 (WIPO Sept. 11, 2000) (finding that the respondent did not register or use the domain name <metagen.com> in bad faith where the respondent registered the domain name in connection with a fair business interest and no likelihood of confusion was created).

 

The Panel finds that Complainant failed to satisfy the requirements of ICANN Policy ¶ 4(a)(iii) to show “bad faith registration and use.”

 

DECISION

Having established all three elements required under the ICANN Policy, the Panel concludes that relief shall be DENIED.

 

Accordingly, it is Ordered that the Complaint be dismissed and that Respondent retain the <joblog.com> domain name.

 

 

Barry Schreiber, Esq., Panel Chair

 

Dianne Cabell, Esq.    

   

Hon. Carolyn Marks Johnson

 

Dated: July 18, 2005

 

 

 

National Arbitration Forum